It is known that even seemingly small fragments of the rst-order temporal logic over the natural numbers are not recursively enumerable. In this paper we show that the monodic (not monadic, where this result doesn't hold) fragment is an exception by constructing its nite Hilbertstyle axiomatization. We also show that the monodic fragment with equality is not recursively axiomatizable.
Introduction
The rst-order temporal logic over the natural numbers TL(N) and even its two-variable monadic fragment are known to be not recursively enumerable (see e.g. 4, 8] and references therein). However, it is shown in 8] that various nontrivial fragments of TL(N) and other rst-order temporal logics are decidable.
All these fragments operate only with the so-called monodic formulas.
De nition 1 (monodic formulas). Let T L be the rst-order temporal language with the temporal operators S (`since'), U (`until') , (`at the next moment'), and P (`at the previous moment') but without equality and functional symbols. Denote by T L 1 the set of all T L-formulas ' such that any subformula of ' of the form 1 S 2 , 1 U 2 , or P has at most one free variable. Such formulas are called monodic.
Here are some examples of monodic formulas, where 3 F and 3 P are the operators`some time in the future' and`some time in the past' expressible via U and S (2 F and 2 P are their duals):
9x3 F '(x) $ 3 F 9x'(x) (the Barcan formula); 2 F 9x ( P(x)^:(>SP(x))) (`at every moment, someone starts to get old'); 8x2 F (Sub(x) ! 2 F :Sub(x)) (this is a constraint for temporal databases from 2]:`an order can be submitted only once'); 1 3 P 9y Works(x; y)^:9y Works(x; y)^3 F 9y Works(x; y) (this is a query to a temporal database from 3]:`list all persons who have been unemployed between jobs'); The following formula (one more query from 3]) is not monodic: 2 P 2 F (:9y (W orks(x; y)^ Works(x; y)^ Works(x; y))) (` nd all job-hoppers|people who never spent more than two years in one place').
It turns out that the monodic fragment of TL(N), though undecidable because it contains full rst-order logic, is recursively enumerable, and moreover can be axiomatized in a rather natural way. To present such an axiomatization is the main aim of this paper (Section 2). We show, however, that by adding equality to T L 1 we restore the`status-quo': the monodic fragment of TL(N) with equality becomes not recursively enumerable (Section 3). And, nally, we note that the monodic uted fragment (in the sense of 9, 10]) as well as the monodic loosely guarded fragment 12] of many rst-order temporal logics are decidable (Section 4), thus extending the list of decidable fragments from 8].
Axiomatization
To make the proofs more transparent, we con ne ourselves to considering only the`future fragment' of the language T L containing two primitive temporal operators and U. The reader should not have any problems in extending the results to the full language simply by adding the corresponding`past counterparts'. Besides, for purely technical reasons we slightly change the semantics of U as compared with 8]: n j = 'U i there exists k n such that k j = and m j = ' for all m such that n m < k (i.e., m 2 n; k)).
The`until' from 8] can be de ned as ('U ). (Note that now is not expressible via U.) TL(N) is the set of T L-formulas that are valid in all rst-order temporal models with the ow of time isomorphic to hN; <i and having constant domains and rigid designators (for a detailed de nition consult 8]).
We propose the following axiomatization MON of the monodic fragment of TL(N) (cf. 5, 11, 4] 
Axiom schemata (over formulas in T L 1 ):
(cl) the set of axiom schemata from some axiomatization of classical rst-order logic;
Inference rules (over formulas in T L 1 ):
(cl) the rules of the axiomatization of classical rst-order logic;
(n 4 ) ' ' ; (u 2 ) ! : ^ ! :('U ) . (Here and below we assume :, and 8 to connect stronger than^and _, which in turn are stronger than !, $ and U.)
Denote by`the consequence relation determined by MON.
In the remainder of this section we will be proving the following:
Theorem 2. For every monodic T L-formula ', we have`' i ' 2 TL(N).
It is easy to check the soundness part ()) of the theorem. For the only non-standard thing in MON is the rule (u 2 ). Suppose = ! : ^ is in TL(N), but = ! :('U ) is not. Consider a model of TL(N) refuting . Then there is a moment n such that n j = and n j = 'U , i.e., there exists k n for which k j = and m j = ' for all m 2 n; k). As is valid in the model, l j = whenever l n. But then k j = : , which is a contradiction.
To De nition 6 (run). Let Q = (C n = hT n ; T con n i : n 2 N) be a sequence of state candidates for '. A run in Q is a map r associating with every n 2 N a type r(n) in T n in such a way that the following holds: the pairs (r(n); r(n + 1)) are suitable for all n 2 N, for every U 2 sub', U 2 r(n) i there exists m n such that 2 r(m) and 2 r(k) for all k 2 n; m). De nition 7 (quasimodel). A sequence Q = (C n = hT n ; T con n i : n 2 N) of state candidates for ' is called a quasimodel for ' if the pairs (C n ; C n+1 ) are suitable for all n 2 N; for every n 2 N and every type t in T n there exists a run r in Q such that r(n) = t;
for every constant c, the function r c de ned by r c (n) = t, for ht; ci 2 T con n , n 2 N, is a run in Q. Say that ' is satis ed in Q if there are n 2 N and a type t in T n such that ' 2 t. Lemma 8. If a monodic sentence ' is satis ed in a quasimodel for ', then it is satis able.
Proof The proof is almost the same as the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 14 in 8]. The only di erence is that now we are not given that the state candidates in Q are realizable. We know, however, that every state candidate C i is consistent, and so there is a rst-order model realizing C i (subformulas of the form and U are regarded as unary predicates or propositional variables).
The remaining part is precisely the same as that of the proof mentioned above. (ii) For every consistent pointed state candidate P 1 = hC 1 ; t 1 i for ', there is a pointed state candidate P 2 = hC 2 ; t 2 i for ' such that P 1 P 2 . Proof (i) Denote by ' the disjunction of formulas C , for all state candidates C for '. As ' is clearly true in all classical rst-order models (subformulas of the form (x) or (x)U (x) are treated as unary predicates), we have` ' and` ' . Therefore, C1^ ' is consistent, and so there must be a state candidate C 2 such that C1^ C2 is consistent.
(ii) Suppose rst that ht 1 ; ci 2 T con 1 . By (i), we can nd C 2 = hT 2 ; T con 2 i such that the pair (C 1 ; C 2 ) is suitable. Let ht 2 ; ci 2 T con 2 . Then the pair (P 1 ; P 2 ), where P 2 = hC 2 ; t 2 i, is also suitable, for otherwise we would havè C1^t1 ! : ( C2^t2 ); and so` C1^t1 (c) ! : ( C2^t2 (c)); i.e.,` C1 ! : C2 , which is a contradiction.
If ht 1 ; ci = 2 T con 1 , then take the disjunction ' of formulas P for all pointed state candidates P for '. We again have` ' , and so P1^ ' is consistent.
Hence there is a pointed state candidate P 2 such that P1^ P2 is consistent.
2
Suppose P 0 = hC 0 ; t 0 i is a consistent pointed state candidate for ' and U 2 t 0 . Suppose also that P 0 ; : : : ; P n , for some n 0, is a sequence of pointed state candidates P i = hC i ; t i i such that P 0 P 1 P n ; 2 t n and 2 t i for all i 2 0; n). Then we say that this sequence realizes U in t 0 .
Lemma 11. For every consistent pointed state candidate P 0 = hC 0 ; t 0 i and every formula U 2 t 0 , there is a sequence P 0 ; : : : ; P n realizing U in t 0 . Proof Suppose otherwise. As P 0 is consistent, we have 6 P0 ! :( U ): we take a state candidate C 1 such that the pair (C 0 ; C 1 ) is suitable and put C n = C 1 .)
Then we consider the types in C n and construct a sequence C n ; : : : ; C m as if C n were C 0 . After that we take care of C m , and so on. It is readily seen (using Lemmas 9 and 11) that the resulting in nite sequence Q is a quasimodel for '. 2
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Monodicity and equality
So far we have considered the rst-order temporal language T L without equality and functional symbols. A natural question is whether our decidability and axiomatizability results concerning the class of monodic formulas can be generalized to the language with these ingredients. It should be clear that functional symbols easily destroy nice properties of the monodic formulas: in the proof of Theorem 2 from 8] we can replace Q 2 (y) and P j (y) with Q 2 (f(x)) and P j (f(x)), respectively, thus obtaining a monodic monadic one-variable formula ' T , associated with a nite set of tiles T, such that ' T is satis able i T recurrently tiles N N. So the class of such formulas cannot be recursively enumerable.
In this section we show that by adding equality we also`spoil' the monodic fragment. Namely, we are going to prove that the monodic fragment T L = 1 with equality is not recursively axiomatizable.
Let us x a unary predicate P and denote by the conjunction of the following formulas:
9xP(x)^8x8y(P(x)^P(y) ! x = y); (6) 2 + F 8x(P(x) ! P(x));
2 + F 8x8y( P(x)^ P(y)^:P(x)^:P(y) ! x = y); (8) 3 F 8x(P(x) $ 3 F P(x)):
Here 2 + F means`now and always in the future,' i.e., 2 + F ' = :(>U:').
The reader can readily check that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 13. For every model M = hhN; <i ; D; Ii, we have 0 j = i the following conditions are satis ed:
8n 2 N (P n P n+1 & P n+1 ? P n 1); 9m 2 N 8k m P m = P k .
(In other words: There is a unique element a 0 2 D for which P(a 0 ) holds true at moment 0; P(a 0 ) remains true always in the future. At moment 1 there may be only two elements a 0 ; a 1 2 D for which P is true, at moment 2 only three such elements, etc. Finally, we eventually reach a moment m starting from which P is stable.) Suppose now that we are given an arbitrary rst-order (non-temporal) sentence which does not contain occurrences of P. Let Now recall that by Trakhtenbrot's theorem (see e.g. 1]) the set of rst-order classical formulas that are valid in nite models is not recursively enumerable. As a consequence we obtain the following:
Theorem 15. The set of T L = 1 -formulas that are valid in all temporal models based on hN; <i is not recursively enumerable, and so not recursively axiomatizable.
It is not clear, however, whether the decidable fragments of rst-order temporal logics found in 8] and below remain decidable after extending the language with equality.
Two more decidable fragments
As was shown in 8], the two-variable monodic fragment, the monadic monodic fragment, and the guarded monodic fragment of many rst-order temporal logics are decidable. Here we extend this list by observing that the monodic fragment can be naturally combined with the uted fragment of classical rst-order logic, which was shown to be decidable and to have the nite model property in 9, 10].
Let X m = (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) be a list of individual variables.
De nition 16 ( uted formulas). An atomic uted formula over X i is an atom of the form P(x k ; x k+1 ; : : : ; x i ) for some k i. Fluted formulas are now de ned inductively as follows: any atomic uted formula over X i is a uted formula over X i ; if ' is a uted formula over X i+1 , then both 9x i+1 ' and 8x i+1 ' are uted formulas over X i ; any Boolean combination of uted formulas over X i is a uted formula over X i ; if ' and are uted formulas over X i then 'U , 'S , ', and P ' are uted formulas over X i .
Finally, we say a formula is uted if it is uted over X i for some i 2 N.
Denote by FLU the set of all uted formulas of our rst-order temporal language.
Theorem 17. Let 
